India's economic discourse often pits the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) regime since 2014 against the preceding United Progressive Alliance (UPA) years from 2004 to 2014. The NDA government has repeatedly highlighted ambitious self-employment initiatives as a cornerstone of job creation, projecting a vibrant entrepreneurial surge that has supposedly transformed the labour market. Schemes like Pradhan Mantri Mudra Yojana (PMMY) are cited as having disbursed over 52 crore loans amounting to more than ₹33 lakh crore, enabling millions to become job creators rather than seekers. Official narratives point to a 36 per cent rise in total employment from roughly 47 crore in 2014-15 to over 64 crore by 2023-24, alongside a sharp drop in unemployment rates. Yet these claims appear tall when scrutinised against the actual scale and quality of self-employment. Meanwhile, GDP growth during the UPA era averaged higher in several peak years, coinciding with a relatively tighter labour market featuring more regular wage opportunities and declining self-employment shares. Does the NDA's GDP trajectory truly mirror or surpass this, or does it reveal a similar disconnect between headline growth and quality employment? This discussion examines the self-employment landscape under NDA, weighing government assertions against empirical trends and comparative GDP dynamics.
The NDA's emphasis on self-employment stems from a deliberate
policy shift towards micro-entrepreneurship and financial inclusion.
Initiatives such as Mudra loans, Stand-Up India, and Skill India were designed
to democratise credit and skills, particularly targeting women, youth, and
rural populations. Proponents argue this has fostered grassroots
entrepreneurship, with self-employment emerging as the dominant employment
category. Data from periodic labour force surveys indicate that the share of
self-employed workers in the total workforce climbed steadily from around 52
per cent in 2017-18 to 58.4 per cent by 2023-24. This includes own-account
workers (running small enterprises) and helpers in household enterprises (often
unpaid family labour). Rural areas show even starker figures, with
self-employment reaching nearly 65 per cent overall, driven heavily by female
participation that has surged due to rising labour force involvement. Women, in
particular, have accounted for much of this growth, often entering as unpaid
helpers or micro-vendors in agriculture and allied activities.
The scale appears impressive on aggregate: total
employment expanded significantly, unemployment fell from 6 per cent in 2017-18
to 3.2 per cent in 2023-24, and the worker population ratio improved alongside
a higher labour force participation rate, especially among rural women.
Government schemes are credited with this, as Mudra loans alone have financed
tiny businesses across villages and towns, ostensibly creating a multiplier
effect in local economies. Proponents further note that this self-employment
boom has coincided with GDP growth averaging around 6 per cent annually (with
recoveries post-pandemic), positioning India as one of the fastest-growing
major economies. The narrative suggests a structural transformation: from
job-seeking to job-creating, reducing dependence on formal salaried roles and
building resilience in the informal sector.
However, a closer examination of the self-employment
landscape reveals nuances that challenge these tall claims. Much of the
increase comprises not robust entrepreneurship but subsistence-level activities
and distress-driven participation. Within the self-employed category, the
proportion of unpaid family helpers has risen notably—from about 13-14 per cent
earlier to over 18 per cent in recent years—predominantly involving rural women
assisting in household farms or small trades without independent income or
decision-making power. Own-account workers, while more entrepreneurial in
theory, often operate in low-productivity segments like street vending, petty
retail, or seasonal agriculture, yielding meagre earnings. Average monthly
earnings for self-employed individuals, particularly women, hover around
₹5,000-6,000 in many cases, barely above subsistence levels and far below
regular wage benchmarks.
Regular wage or salaried employment, the hallmark of a
tighter and more secure labour market, has seen its share stagnate or slightly
decline to around 21-22 per cent, even as total workforce numbers grew. Casual
labour has also contracted modestly, but the overall shift leans towards
informal self-reliance rather than formal job creation. Agriculture remains the
largest employer within self-employment, absorbing much of the rural influx
despite its declining GDP contribution. This pattern intensified post-2017-18
and especially after the pandemic disruptions, when millions turned to
self-employment as a fallback amid limited formal opportunities in
manufacturing or services. Critics argue this reflects "distress
self-employment"—people engaging in any available work to survive rather
than thriving enterprises born of opportunity. The Mudra loans, while
voluminous, include a high share of small "Shishu" category advances
(under ₹50,000) that fund survival ventures with limited scalability or repayment
sustainability in some cases. Thus, while the absolute numbers paint a picture
of dynamism, the quality and sustainability raise questions about whether this
constitutes genuine empowerment or a statistical absorption of underemployed
labour.
Comparing this to the UPA period provides critical
context. During 2004-2014, self-employment's share in the workforce declined
from over 56 per cent in mid-2000s surveys to around 50-51 per cent by 2011-12.
This coincided with a rise in regular wage/salaried jobs, particularly in urban
areas and services, reflecting a tightening labour market where formal
opportunities expanded modestly. Employment growth was slower overall—adding
roughly 2.9 crore jobs over the decade—but the composition suggested less
distress, with salaried proportions climbing from 18-19 per cent to over 22 per
cent in some assessments. GDP growth during UPA averaged higher in several
stretches, touching 8-9 per cent in peak years before global and domestic
slowdowns, supported by consumption-led expansion and infrastructure push. The
labour market felt tighter because open unemployment remained low (around 2-4
per cent in earlier metrics), and workers had relatively better access to wage
work amid economic buoyancy. High GDP translated into some absorption in
organised sectors, reducing reliance on pure self-survival modes.
Under NDA, GDP growth has been robust in
phases—averaging broadly comparable or slightly moderated post-2014 (around 6
per cent overall, accounting for COVID contraction and recovery)—yet the
self-employment surge has reversed the UPA trend. This raises the query: does
GDP growth suggest the same labour market tightness? The answer is nuanced but
leans negative. High GDP under UPA coexisted with slower total job addition but
better quality shifts away from self-employment. In the NDA era, impressive GDP
rebounds and formalisation efforts (via digital payments, EPFO enrollments)
have not prevented a disproportionate rise in self-employment as the primary
buffer. Total employment numbers have indeed jumped, but much of the gain stems
from increased participation (especially women) in low-earning, informal
self-work rather than a proportional tightening through regular jobs.
Unemployment metrics have improved on paper, yet this partly reflects definitional
inclusion of even minimal self-activity as "employment." If GDP
growth were driving a genuinely tighter market akin to UPA's salaried
expansion, one would expect stable or rising regular wage shares and higher
real earnings across categories—trends that remain subdued amid persistent
informal dominance.
Several factors explain the divergence. NDA policies
prioritised ease of doing business, credit access, and skilling for
self-reliance, which boosted participation but exposed vulnerabilities in a
low-productivity economy. Demographic pressures, automation in formal sectors,
and uneven manufacturing growth limited salaried absorption. In contrast, UPA's
growth phase benefited from global tailwinds and domestic demand that
marginally favoured wage employment. Neither regime achieved ideal
formalisation, but the NDA's self-employment landscape, while numerically
expansive, appears more a coping mechanism than the entrepreneurial revolution
claimed. Earnings data underscore this: self-employed incomes lag salaried ones
significantly, and gender gaps persist sharply.
In conclusion, the NDA regime's self-employment scale and landscape reflect a mixed legacy. Government claims of transformative job creation through Mudra and allied schemes are impressive in volume—fueling higher participation, lower headline unemployment, and total employment growth far exceeding UPA's pace. Yet the ground reality tempers these assertions: the bulk comprises informal, low-productivity, and often distress-driven self-work, with unpaid helpers and subsistence enterprises dominating rather than scalable businesses. GDP growth, while solid and sometimes outpacing global peers, does not fully corroborate a tighter labour market parallel to UPA's era, where high growth aligned with declining self-employment shares and more regular opportunities. Instead, it highlights a persistent Indian challenge—growth without proportional quality jobs. For sustainable progress, future policies must bridge this gap by enhancing productivity in self-employment, expanding formal avenues, and ensuring earnings growth keeps pace with participation. Only then can tall claims translate into broad-based prosperity, moving beyond survival self-reliance to genuine economic empowerment. The landscape underscores that numbers alone do not define success; the nature of work does.