Introduction
The observation that a persistent long-term decline in
a country's currency can reveal underlying economic weakness contains an
important economic truth, but it needs qualification. A currency can depreciate
for many reasons, and depreciation by itself is not proof of economic failure.
What matters is why the currency is depreciating, whether domestic inflation is
under control, whether productivity is rising, whether real wages are
increasing, whether foreign capital is arriving, and what happens to the country's
real effective exchange rate, or REER. For India, this distinction is
especially important. The rupee has depreciated substantially against the US
dollar over the past several decades, and particularly since 2014. Yet India
has also experienced rapid real economic growth, rising foreign-exchange
reserves, substantial foreign investment, expanding services exports, and
considerable improvements in macroeconomic stability. Therefore, the rupee's
decline against the dollar cannot simply be interpreted as evidence of
structural decay. The more meaningful question is whether India's currency has
depreciated faster than justified by India's relative inflation and
productivity fundamentals. This is precisely where the REER becomes essential.
The Theory of Long-Run
Exchange Rates
The simplest theory is purchasing power parity, or
PPP. It suggests that, over a sufficiently long period, exchange rates should
adjust to differences in inflation between countries. If India experiences
higher inflation than the United States, the rupee should gradually depreciate
against the dollar to preserve relative purchasing power.
This means that a country can experience a nominally
weaker currency without suffering an equivalent loss of international
competitiveness. Suppose Indian inflation averages 5 percent while US inflation
averages 2 percent. Even if India's productivity is improving rapidly, some
rupee depreciation against the dollar would be expected over time.
The second important theory is the Balassa-Samuelson
effect. Developing countries that experience rapid productivity growth in
tradable sectors may see wages rise across the economy. Higher wages increase
the prices of non-tradable services, causing domestic inflation and a tendency
toward nominal currency appreciation or, at least, slower depreciation in real
terms. Thus, economic development can produce a complex relationship between
productivity, wages, prices, and exchange rates.
The third concept is the REER. Unlike the bilateral
rupee-dollar rate, the REER compares the rupee with a basket of currencies
belonging to India's major trading partners and adjusts for relative price
movements. A REER index above its base-period value generally indicates real
appreciation, while a lower value indicates real depreciation, although
interpretation depends on the index construction and base year.
Therefore, the REER is a much better indicator of
India's underlying external competitiveness than simply saying that the rupee
moved from around ₹60 per dollar in 2014 to the mid-₹80s or beyond in the
following years. The bilateral dollar rate reflects not only India's economic
conditions but also the strength of the dollar itself.
India's Historical Experience
India's exchange-rate history illustrates this
distinction clearly. Before the 1991 balance-of-payments crisis, India operated
under a much more controlled exchange-rate regime. The crisis forced major
reforms, including devaluation and the eventual transition toward a
market-determined exchange rate.
The rupee subsequently experienced several major episodes
of depreciation. The Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, the
2013 "taper tantrum," the COVID-19 shock, and periodic global dollar
strengthening all placed downward pressure on the currency.
Since 2014, the rupee has weakened considerably
against the dollar. But this period has not been characterized by
hyperinflation, monetary collapse, or a persistent balance-of-payments crisis.
India's inflation-targeting framework, introduced in the mid-2010s, has
strengthened the credibility of monetary policy. Foreign-exchange reserves have
also risen dramatically compared with earlier decades, providing a substantial
buffer against external shocks.
This is why interpreting the rupee solely through its
dollar exchange rate can be misleading.
India's real economic transformation has also been
significant. The World Bank's latest available data put India's nominal GDP at
roughly $4 trillion in 2025, with real GDP growth of about 7.6 percent and GDP
per capita of approximately $2,700. These figures demonstrate rapid economic
expansion, although India's per-capita income remains far below that of
advanced economies.
The REER and India's Current Position
The REER provides a more sophisticated picture.
India's REER has at various times been above 100, indicating periods of real
appreciation, and at other times moved closer to or below 100, depending on the
RBI's selected basket, base year, and methodology.
The important point is that a REER near 100 does not
automatically mean that the rupee is "correctly valued," nor does a
REER below 100 automatically mean that the currency is fundamentally
undervalued. The index is relative to a base period. It does not represent an
absolute measure of fair value.
The broad Indian experience, however, suggests that
the rupee's long-term nominal depreciation has been partly offset by India's
relatively higher inflation. In other words, the rupee has lost substantial value
against the dollar, but its real depreciation has been much smaller than the
nominal depreciation might suggest.
This has an important policy implication. If India's
REER is close to its historical benchmark or moderately undervalued,
policymakers should not necessarily attempt to force the rupee upward. A
competitive real exchange rate can support manufacturing, tourism, IT-enabled
services, and merchandise exports. But an excessively undervalued REER can also
raise the domestic cost of imported oil, machinery, technology, and
intermediate goods.
India therefore needs an exchange rate that is competitive
but not artificially weak.
The scope for further rupee depreciation should
consequently be judged against productivity growth, inflation differentials,
current-account sustainability, capital flows, and the REER—not merely against
a psychological exchange-rate level such as ₹100 per dollar.
Strong Currency as a Sign of Development
The argument that a strong currency can represent
economic strength is also broadly valid, but again requires nuance.
The US dollar, euro, and British pound are strong
international currencies partly because the economies behind them possess high
productivity, deep financial markets, strong institutions, technological
capabilities, stable legal systems, and enormous global demand for their
assets. Their currencies are also used as reserve and transaction currencies.
A strong currency allows households to purchase
imported goods, energy, technology, education, and foreign assets more cheaply.
It increases international purchasing power and can improve living standards.
But a strong currency is not always beneficial. If it
becomes excessively strong relative to productivity, exporters may lose
competitiveness, manufacturing can suffer, and current-account deficits may
widen. Japan's experience during periods of substantial yen appreciation
demonstrates this tension.
For India, the long-run objective should therefore not
be an artificially "strong rupee." The real objective should be a
steadily appreciating economic foundation that eventually supports a stronger
rupee.
That foundation comes from higher productivity, rising
real wages, better infrastructure, improved education and health, technological
advancement, deeper capital markets, stronger institutions, and sustained
foreign investment.
The Indian Paradox
India therefore presents an interesting paradox. The
rupee has weakened significantly against the dollar, yet the Indian economy has
grown rapidly. This means the currency's depreciation should not automatically
be interpreted as evidence of economic collapse.
At the same time, the depreciation should not be
dismissed as irrelevant.
A persistent decline in the rupee can become
problematic if it reflects a combination of high inflation, weak productivity,
inadequate export competitiveness, excessive dependence on imported energy,
large fiscal deficits, capital outflows, or declining investor confidence.
India's oil dependence makes this especially
important. When the rupee weakens, imported crude oil becomes more expensive in
rupee terms. This can raise transportation costs, production costs, inflation,
and the current-account deficit. Currency depreciation can therefore become
self-reinforcing if it increases inflation and forces monetary policy to remain
tighter for longer.
However, India also possesses important countervailing
strengths. Its services exports, remittances, domestic savings, large internal
market, digital economy, and growing manufacturing capabilities provide
structural support to the balance of payments. The country is therefore fundamentally
different from an economy experiencing uncontrolled currency collapse.
Precedents and International Examples
The historical experience of the dollar, pound, and
euro also shows why currency strength should be understood in relative terms.
The US dollar remains exceptionally powerful because
the United States combines high productivity with deep financial markets and
the dollar's reserve-currency status. The British pound remains internationally
important despite the UK's smaller economic size because of London's financial
system and institutional depth. The euro represents the combined economic
strength of a large group of advanced economies and functions as a major
reserve currency.
These currencies are not strong simply because their
governments "defend" them. Their strength ultimately reflects the
economic capacity and credibility of the systems behind them.
For India, the lesson is clear. The rupee will become
structurally stronger when India's productivity and per-capita incomes converge
toward advanced economies. India's current GDP per capita remains only a small
fraction of US levels, which means substantial room remains for productivity
and income growth before the rupee can be expected to have the purchasing power
associated with mature advanced economies.
Policy Remedies
Indian policymaking should therefore focus less on
defending any particular nominal exchange-rate number and more on improving the
fundamentals that determine the currency's long-run value.
The first priority should be price stability. The
RBI's inflation-targeting framework should remain credible, because persistent
inflation is ultimately one of the most important forces behind long-term
currency depreciation.
The second priority should be productivity. India
needs greater investment in education, health, skills, logistics, electricity,
research, technology, and urban infrastructure. Productivity growth is the most
sustainable route toward higher real wages and a stronger currency.
The third priority should be export competitiveness.
India should move beyond reliance on a weak rupee as an export strategy. A
genuinely competitive economy should be able to export because of quality,
technology, scale, reliability, and productivity rather than simply because its
currency is cheap.
The fourth priority should be reducing vulnerability
to imported energy. Greater renewable energy, domestic energy production,
electrification, and energy efficiency can reduce the external shock
transmitted through oil prices and the exchange rate.
The fifth priority should be attracting stable
long-term foreign investment rather than relying excessively on volatile
portfolio flows. Foreign direct investment brings technology, management
expertise, employment, and productive capacity.
Finally, India should allow the RBI to manage
excessive exchange-rate volatility while avoiding an obsession with defending a
particular rupee-dollar level. Intervention should smooth disorderly movements,
not permanently resist economic fundamentals.
Conclusion
The original observation is therefore directionally correct but requires a crucial distinction. A currency that continuously depreciates because of uncontrolled inflation, falling productivity, fiscal instability, capital flight, and declining investor confidence is indeed a warning sign of structural economic weakness. But a currency that depreciates gradually because of inflation differentials, a strengthening dollar, productivity catch-up, and the normal adjustment of a rapidly growing developing economy tells a very different story. India's rupee should therefore be judged not simply by how many rupees are required to buy one dollar. The more meaningful indicators are India's REER, inflation relative to trading partners, productivity growth, real wages, export performance, current-account sustainability, foreign investment, and the quality of institutions. The ultimate goal of Indian economic policy should be to create conditions in which real wages rise faster, productivity increases, domestic incomes expand, foreign investment becomes deeper and more stable, and India's REER remains competitive without requiring perpetual nominal depreciation. In that sense, the strongest currency is not necessarily the one with the highest exchange-rate value today. The strongest currency is the one backed by an economy whose productivity, real wages, incomes, institutions, technology, and global competitiveness are continuously becoming stronger. If India achieves that transformation, a stronger rupee will eventually become not an artificial policy target, but a natural consequence of economic development.
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